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Abstract: Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some 
invertebrates are sentient and hence should be granted moral status. I agree and argue that 
functional markers should be the primary indicators of sentience. Neuroanatomical homologies 
provide only secondary evidence. Consensus regarding the validity of these functional markers will 
be difficult to achieve. To be effective in practice, functional markers of sentience will have to be 
tested and accepted species by species to overcome the implicit biases against extending moral 
status to invertebrates.  
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Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) argue convincingly that there is no empirically valid reason 
to deny “certain invertebrates” the moral standing afforded to nonhuman vertebrates by 
bioethics and science policy on the basis of comparable data. In the tradition of ethicists from 
Jeremy Bentham (1780/2019) in the 18th century to Peter Singer (1975) in the 20th, M&P invoke 
sentience as the touchstone for according moral status; they review the compelling evidence that 
at least some invertebrates are sentient.  
I would define sentience as the minimal capacity for direct subjective experience of the 
qualities associated with sensations, including accompanying affective states. Sentient beings, 
therefore, have the ability to feel an experience, and this feel will have some “valence” associated 
with it; in the simplest context, the experience may be either good or bad. As M&P note, the focus 
of bioethics and science policy governing the use of animals in research has followed Bentham’s 
emphasis on the prevention of bad experiences, particularly pain and suffering. For example, 
detailed protocols are in place regarding the use of specific anesthetics and analgesics during and 
after surgery in experimental vertebrate animals. 
In addition to the moral obligation to avoid creating pain “broadly construed” in animal 
subjects, M&P also clearly articulate our moral obligation to “provide positive conditions in which 
sentient animals can flourish — environments in which they can experience greater amounts of 
pleasure and develop their natural range of abilities.” This is a valid philosophical position, but 
the practical complexity of determining what constitutes pleasure and flourishing in nonverbal 
animals makes it even more complicated to resolve the fundamental problem discussed 
extensively by M&P: determining whether nonverbal animals are sentient at all. 
Animal Sentience 2020.345:  Woodruff on Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds 
2 
 
Achieving a consensus solution on sentience has already proven elusive, even when the 
discussion is limited to one specific qualitative sensation — the feeling of pain — and the subjects 
are vertebrates, such as fishes. Fishes exhibit many flexible and intricate behaviors strongly 
supporting the inference that they have a high level of cognitive sophistication. Fishes also 
respond to analgesics in the same way mammals do — convincing support that fishes are sentient 
and experience pain (Brown 2014, Sneddon 2015, Sneddon et al. 2018).  
Some scientists (Key 2016, Rose 2002, Rose et al. 2014) strongly disagree,  contending that 
even the most complex behaviors of fishes are explicable as reflexes and complex species-typical 
behaviors, and that the effects of analgesics in fishes can be explained not by their ability to block 
the conscious experience of pain, but solely by their ability to blockade nociception. They argue 
that the brains of fishes are too simple to support sentience, but research spanning the last three 
decades indicates that the neuroanatomy of the brains of fishes is remarkably complex and 
exhibits several of the physiological markers suggested to accompany phenomenal consciousness 
and the experience of pain in humans (Woodruff 2017, 2018a, b). Although the neuroanatomy of 
fishes is not homologous with the thalamo — cortical system of mammals — fish brains are 
capable of functioning in an analogous manner to produce similar behavioral and physiological 
markers of sentience. 
These findings support the position of M&P, which should emphasize analogy rather than 
homology. In the biological sciences, structures are defined as homologous across species when 
they are inherited from a common ancestor. They may or may not have the same function as they 
did in that ancestor or in members of other descendent species. An independent analysis of the 
relationship between anatomical structure and metrics such as physiological or behavioral 
activities must be made before functional analogies can be formulated for homologous 
structures. Or, as M&P express it, “homology hypotheses are not function-free and hence have 
no independent advantages over functional analyses of convergent brains.”  
Functional markers of mental states, such as sentience, are fundamental. Structural 
homologies are secondary. Behavioral and physiological activities analogous to those associated 
with sentience in vertebrates are adequate to establish sentience in invertebrate species 
regardless of whether their brains are homologous structurally. Achieving consensus on which 
functional activities are valid markers of mental states has proven difficult even for some 
vertebrate species; hence reaching a consensus for invertebrates that includes markers for 
flourishing — a concept far more complex than simply feeling pain — will be still more difficult. 
Moreover, if the goal is change in public policy, lay policymakers must be meaningfully involved 
in the discussion. In my own experience, laypersons often find it more difficult than professional 
scientists and philosophers to substitute rational, evidence-based decision-making for the 
cognitive-affective biases described by M&P. 
M&P discuss the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP) proposed by Birch (2017) 
as a way of generalizing functional observations across an entire order of animal. They note 
difficulties with the ASPP, including behavioral underdetermination. I agree with this critique and 
would go further to suggest that overcoming disgust and the empathy gap cannot be realistically 
approached other than with species-by-species analyses of behavioral activities. This does not 
eliminate the problem of behavioral underdetermination, but it will make generalizability more 
convincing because of the similarity of the subjects involved. 
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If behaviors that many people accept as indicators of the ability to have positive and 
negative feelings are identified in an invertebrate species, it will become easier for people to 
develop empathy for an alien-appearing animal such as the octopus (Mather 2019), and thereby 
become more concerned about its welfare. This proposal is supported by social psychologists who 
have discovered that humans who eat meat attribute significantly fewer indicators of sentience 
to animals that end up on their plate than do vegetarians (Bastian et al. 2012, Bilewiczi et al. 2011, 
Loughnan et al. 2010). 
In conclusion, I have attempted to make the following points. First, in agreement with M&P, 
based on inferring sentience from empirical evidence that reveals the flexibility and complexity 
of their behaviors, moral status should be extended to at least some invertebrates. Second, 
functional behavioral and physiological markers should be the primary indicators of sentience in 
invertebrates. Structural neuroanatomical homologies provide only secondary evidence. Third, a 
consensus that these functional markers are valid indicators of sentience will be difficult to 
achieve; to be effective in practice, they will have to be provided and accepted on a species-by-
species basis rather than en bloc. Finally, I agree with Levy (2020) that “Much of the work done 
by appeals to phenomenal consciousness can in fact be done by functionalizable properties of the 
mind” (p. 2). To overcome the implicit biases against extending moral status to invertebrates, 
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